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Abstract: I argue how one’s afterimage of art has turned ideological due 
to technology’s heavy influence in the reproduction of and to individuals’ 
incessant consumption of artworks. Art has the capacity to be historicity’s 
expression and its antithesis. Its reach has been enlarged due to technology’s 
democratization of artworks. It should follow that mass production of 
artworks foster an emancipatory and critical standpoint, yet this fostered 
instead the reduction of priceless and fine artworks to commodities, easily 
downloadable and available for public consumption. Rather than being 
society’s antithesis, the afterimage of emancipation has been fetishized into 
an ideological-image of fulfilling a fantasy (the promise of ‘jouissance’). The 
20th century’s dictum “They know very well it is false and [are] still doing it!” 
embodies the consequence – despite the empty promises – of capitalism: 
liberation ideology (a mistaken understanding of ideology as liberation). 
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AFTERIMAGES: LIBERATION 
IDEOLOGY IN THE CULTURE 
INDUSTRY1 
1 
gainst the backdrop of culture 
industry, facets of culture must be 
reconsidered. This short essay is 
concerned with the effect of art and the 
afterimage it produces: from an emancipatory-
image to an ideological-image. My use of 
“Liberation” (the word liberation with a 
strikethrough) is intentional to stress the heavy 
importance of a mistaken idea that artworks 
project and promise. Instead of censorship, a 
strikethrough enables readers to see what has 
been deleted; epanorthosis as a figure of speech 
and way of writing reflects self-correction. 
What I intend to underscore is this self-
correcting consciousness, dealing with 
mistaken liberation and outright ideology, 
through the two afterimages of art that serve as 
primal argument. Strikethroughs throughout 
this article garners evidence of how an 
                                                          
1 This is a revised version of the essay “Art and 
Alienation: Liberation Ideology in The Culture 
Industry”, which I presented during the Second Annual 
De La Salle Undergraduate Philosophy Conference last 
4-5 August 2017 at the De La Salle University, Taft, 
Manila. My change in title stresses the importance of 
afterimages, a concept I have formulated but have not 
clearly laid out in my previous construction. This 
revision has given necessary importance to afterimages—
albeit still languid in demonstration. Admittingly, I 
peresent my ideas in a rather sporadic manner than the 
previous delineated approach. I roughly group and 
number them accordingly. The transition therefore 
between ideas are less of my concern as compared to the 
exact demonstrations. Hence, groupings vary in length 
but are considerable substantial in content. 
2 I loosely use and interchange the terms “art-
experiencer,” “individual,” and “art-consumer” 
emancipatory idea brews within illusion’s 
confinement.  
My main argument banks on art’s 
afterimage. I situate art in relation to the art-
experiencer. This is a dialectical process: art 
supplies content while the experiencer2 gives 
the form—be it emancipatory or ideological. 
The emancipatory-image serves as society’s 
antithesis, positing another state of things; the 
ideological-image strengthens commodity’s 
presentation and fetishizes a need to consume 
more. Rather than reflecting the present milieu 
or serving as an antithesis, art in the second 
respect makes consumers focus on specific 
parts of a piece and caters this fetishized taste. 
It is during the “art event” that the exchange of 
commodities takes place and that afterimages 
are formed. It becomes an oscillation of the 
afterimage to the after-image, reflecting 
liberation to ideology.3  
2 
Adorno presents art as an autonomous 
development “located in a historically changing 
constellation of elements; it refuses 
definition.”4 He shows how art aims at 
throughout this piece yet the specific usage is grounded 
on context. 
3 Paintings, sculptures, film, and architectural 
works – among others – become photographs, graphic 
artworks, recordings, and even “icons” for locations. My 
use of the term “after-image” is a play of words and is 
separate from the afterimages of emancipatory- and 
ideological-image. After-images are literally images 
created after artworks. I would not like to classify them 
as derogated appearances of the opus, but that through 
the mediatory platform they have become something 
distinct from the artwork. This is aligned to my argument 
that technology and media fetishize our consumption 
and make artworks available for public consumption 
(e.g. printed on cards and apparel and bolstered through 
social media).  
4 Theodore W. Adorno, “The Autonomy of 
Art,” Negative Dialectics, tr. E. B. Ashton, from the 
A 
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challenging its own definition. This is 
important because of the blindness that art 
assumes—blindness produces uncertainty, 
which gives art its critical feature: “the 
uncertainty over what purpose it serves. It is 
uncertain whether art is still possible; whether, 
with its complete emancipation, it did not sever 
its own preconditions.”5 What art engenders 
therefore against the emerging backdrop of the 
culture industry is rather a façade—the 
insecurities of art indeed is what draws 
consumers to consume more of it. Art affirms 
itself by being its own antithesis: “Art must tum 
against itself, in opposition to its own concept, 
and thus become uncertain of itself right into 
its innermost fiber.”6 In similar vein, Hegel 
comments: “But [external existence] is not 
what makes a work into a product of fine art; a 
work of art is such only because, originating 
from the spirit, it now belongs to the territory 
of the spirit.”7 Art’s classification as fine is 
precisely because of its reflective nature; the 
artwork from Geist is grounded on historicity as 
Geist develops through time. 
The universal and absolute need 
from which art (on its formal side) 
springs has its origin in the fact that 
man is a thinking consciousness, i.e. 
that man draws out of himself and 
puts before himself what he is and 
whatever else is. Things in nature are 
only immediate and single, while man as 
spirit duplicates himself, in that (i) he is 
as things in nature are, but (ii) he is 
just as much for himself; he sees 
                                                          
original, Negative Dialektik (Suhrkamp Verlag, 1966), 
(New York: The Seabury Press, 1973), 2. 
5 Adorno, Aesthetic Theory, eds. Gretel Adorno 
and Rolf Tiedemann, tr. Robert Hullot-Kentor, from the 
original Asthetische Theorie (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp 
Verlag, 1970), (London: Continuum Press, 1997), 1. 
himself, represents himself to 
himself, thinks, and only on the 
strength of this active placing himself 
before himself is he spirit.8 
What art is as a product of human activity is 
therefore a representation of what individuals 
are at a particular milieu; art-experiencers see 
themselves in artworks as the latter engenders 
the Zeitgeist. Yet these works are antithetical by 
being thought-provoking, challenging 
individuals to see themselves in such works. As 
art struggles for its freedom, so do individuals. 
3 
There is a certain given-ness in oeuvres 
that people take for granted—the limits of 
artworks: ends of canvasses, borders of 
pictures, lenses of cameras, technicalities of 
music-making (composing, performing, etc.), 
duration of performances (of theatre arts), and 
even the entire landscape where architectural 
or sculptural works are displayed and/or 
crafted. Each individual approach these 
borders, and the art event commences. I 
rework Tia DeNora’s musical event for a more 
inclusive presentation of the encounter 
between the individual and the artwork as I 
seek to stress the impact and formation of the 
afterimage in individuals. DeNora presents 
three times: 
TIME 1 – Before the Event (all prior 
history as meaningful to A) 
6 Ibid., 2. 
7 Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel, 
“Introduction,” Aesthetics. Lectures on Fine Art, tr. T. M. 
Knox (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1975), 29. 
8 Ibid., 30-31. 
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1. Preconditions Conventions, 
biographical associations, previous 
programming practices 
TIME 2 – During the Event (the event 
may be of any duration, seconds to years) 
2. Features of the Event 
A. Actor(s) Who is engaging 
with music? (e.g., analyst, audience, 
listener, performer, composer, 
programmer) 
B. Music What music, and with 
what significance as imputed by 
Actor(s)? 
C. Act of Engagement with 
music What is being done? (e.g., 
individual act of listening, 
responding to music, performing, 
composing) 
D. Local conditions of C. (e.g., 
how came to engage with music in 
this way, at this time (i.e., at Time 2 – 
‘During the Event’)) 
E. Environment In what setting 
does engagement with music take 
place? (material cultural features, 
interpretive frames provided on site 
(e.g., programme notes, comments 
of other listeners)) 
TIME 3 – After the Event 
3. Outcome Has engagement 
with music afforded anything? What 
                                                          
9 Tia DeNora, After Adorno: Rethinking Music 
Sociology (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003), 
49. 
if anything was changed or achieved 
or made possible by this 
engagement? And has this process 
altered any aspect of item 1 above?9 
Time 1 is before the art encounter: all the 
education that artists and art-experiencers 
receive, the practices and drafts, the 
preparation of the venue, and akin. This 
establishes the boundaries of the artwork—the 
artists choose the locale, the art-experiencers 
learn about these artworks and is drawn. Time 
2 is the exact encounter between artwork and 
art-experiencer with five features. Time 3 
consists of the afterimages that are formed in 
the consciousness.  
 The art event in itself does not have 
determining characteristics. It does not 
prefigure alienation or a more authentic 
experience of the artwork. These valuations are 
appraised through the experiencer’s 
encounter—especially with emphasis on Time 
1: the individual’s culture-formation, how art is 
understood, and the value ascribed to it. 
Through this type of education, consumers 
understand the aesthetic value of art. Against 
the backdrop of the culture industry and in 
association to my arguments, I prefigure 
consumers with a specific mindset gathered 
through their education and exact living: “[t]he 
listener is converted, along his line of least 
resistance, into the acquiescent purchaser.”10 
Despite the conscious repulsions – if there are 
any – consumers are unconsciously held tighter 
by the industry. Thus, I argue that during this 
art event an exchange of commodity takes 
place and the afterimage formed. On part of 
10 Adorno, “On the Fetish Character in Music 
and the Regression of Listening,” The Culture Industry: 
Selected Essays on Mass Culture, ed. J. M. Bernstein 
(London: Routledge, 1991), 32. 
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the consumer, what is made available for 
exchange ranges from money in form of 
payment, pleasure with discs rather than 
watching in the cinema, time spent browsing 
for high-quality photographs of sculptures and 
architectural designs, upgrades from record 
players to online streaming, or even 
contentment with imitations or photographs 
rather than the actual experience of the 
artwork. What the artwork offers for exchange, 
regardless of specific branch of art, is the 
content of commodity fetishism. This 
exchange happens simultaneously and 
continues to nurture one another: the 
consumer pays for freedom pays for unlimited 
access for more commodities under the 
pretense that one is experiencing art and 
freedom. Furthermore, the afterimage is self-
deceiving because of the consumer’s illusion of 
understanding the artwork yet at the same time 
is blinded by art’s demagogic essence. The 
culture industry is motivated by the 
entertainment it offers its patrons: 
Entertainment promises freedom. 
“Entertainment fosters the resignation which 
seeks to forget itself in entertainment.”11 The 
fact that it entertains forces the individual to 
think less and to focus on familiar leitmotifs. 
Ideology breeds further ideology. Instead of an 
emancipatory-image, the individual forms an 
ideological-image as one is drawn to further 
                                                          
11 Theodore Adorno and Max Horkheimer, 
“The Culture Industry: Enlightenment as Mass 
Deception,” Dialectic of Enlightenment: Philosophical 
Fragments, ed. Gunzelin Schmid Noerr, tr. Edmund 
Jephcott, from the original Gesammelte Schriften: Dialektik 
der Aufklärung und Schriften 1940–1950 (Frankfurt am 
Main: S. Fishcher Verlag, 1987), (Stanford: Stanford 
University Press, 2002), 113. 
12 This work presupposes technology’s 
(re)production of art. An affinity that I can draw, albeit 
a rough comparison, would be to Plato’s dichotomy of 
consume more entertainment, more familiar 
themes, and more of the same. 
4 
Prior to the Enlightenment, many 
things (and activities) made sense in so far as it 
had to be made manually (manus [Lt. hand]). 
However, with the dawn of efficient and 
standardized processes, less use of the hands 
was needed and technology became the 
intermediate. Quite ironically, the root word 
finds difference in contemporary meaning: 
(techne) would have conveyed a 
particular skill or ability of an individual, whilst 
the contemporary word (technology) portrays 
the skill of something artificial. The imprint of 
the human person is only through the 
production of something mechanical or 
artificial. This slow regression of human’s 
direct imprint made possible ways of 
(re)producing art and branding it as a delicacy 
to be consumed: One can just look, to be more 
specific, how the internet has made available 
for download and consumption artworks that 
were previously restricted for museum- or 
concert hall-visits. This even made possible the 
use of these artworks to be printed on shirts 
and bags, up on posters, and as symbols of the 
places from where they originate. The entire 
idea of a (re)production of art is based on the 
accessibility to the consumer.12 
worlds. “Now take a line which has been cut into two 
unequal parts, and divide each of them again in the same 
proportion, and suppose the two main divisions to 
answer, one to the visible and the other to the 
intelligible[.]” (Plato, The Republic, VII, trans. Benjamin 
Jowett, available from http://classics.mit.edu/ Plato/ 
republic.7.vi.html; Internet; accessed 24 September 
2016) He posits an epistemological rift. MacIntyre 
follows this saying: “Plato supposed . . . that if there are 
objective standards for the use of such predicates, it 
must be the case that such predicates be used to refer to 
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The effect of a mass culture that is 
dissociated with those it identifies itself with 
becomes a pseudo-normative basis, replacing 
consciousness with a quasi-transcendental 
ideological image or cultures its taste for such 
a fetish. “The power of the culture industry’s 
ideology is such that conformity has replaced 
consciousness.”13 Conformity enables further 
progresses in society through an oriented 
principle that diminishes ambiguity. The 
underlying unifying principle, i.e. the culture 
industry, that consumers unknowingly cling to 
destroys peculiarities by subsuming them.14 
“The concepts of order which [mass culture] 
hammers into human beings are always those 
of the status quo. They remain unquestioned, 
unanalysed and undialectically presupposed, 
even if they no longer have any substance for 
those who accept them.”15 Ideas that remain 
hovering over the entities they ought to 
                                                          
objects, and objects not belonging to the multifarious, 
changing world of sense but to another unchanging 
world apprehended by the intellect precisely through its 
dialectical ascent, whereby it grasps the meaning of 
abstract nouns, and of other general terms. These 
objects are the Forms, through the imitation of which or 
participation in which the objects of sense perception 
have the character that they have.” (Alasdair MacIntyre, 
A Short History of Ethics [Oxford: Routledge, 1998], 40-
41)  
I veer away, however, from such juxtaposition 
for several reasons: (1) the scope of this study is to see 
how technology severs the effect brought about by the 
arts notwithstanding the disparity between authentic and 
represented; Plato’s work takes into earnest 
consideration the ontological properties and that 
basically all things present in the Visible World are 
deemed imitations of the Pure Form. (2) Art’s 
prominence throughout history ties a strong link 
between the individual and the artwork, hence the 
dawning of the culture industry merely carried on this 
ideal by incorporating (and fetishizing) one’s 
consumptions of artworks; Plato’s theory merely lays 
down fundamental principles regarding a state of 
immediate cognition, not present therein is a spark of 
any emancipation—sans the escaped prisoner from his 
Myth of the Cave (as seen in The Republic (514a-517c). (3) 
identify with become oppressive as they 
alienate form from content, subscribers from 
ideas, while presenting them as basic 
presuppositions. What creeps into individuals 
is a consciousness “developed 
retrogressively”16 by organizing objects into 
fetishized products of society; they do not beg 
to be challenged; they pass off as something 
efficient and pleasing.  
5 
[I]deology [is] a set of representations 
which constitute social subjectivity. 
These representations exist in 
conjunction with communal rituals 
and an unconscious social fantasy 
which conditions the enjoyment of 
subjects’ participation in their 
political community. By regulating 
the relationship between the visible 
This sees the vitality of – but does not question – what 
technology does to an artwork by presenting and 
bringing it closer to individuals through the internet. So, 
the question as to whether the artwork is merely 
reproduced, or an entirely new form is produced remains 
unanswered; Plato’s theory would provide an immediate 
solution in that they are reproductions of reproductions. In 
both ends, technology either reproduces or produces 
(anew) artworks: The former as it is gives in a digitalized 
format what one previously needed to venture to 
experience; the latter due to the question of the extent 
the work is reproduced in being digitalized, as something 
novel is entirely created. These new presentations 
however are not reflected in my use of after-images 
because the former stresses the novelty of the 
(re)produced work, while the latter merely reflects this 
gray region that technology creates. 
13 Adorno, “Culture Industry Reconsidered,” 
The Culture Industry: Selected Essays on Mass Culture, 104. 
14 This is labelled as “the objective spirit of an 
age in the single word ‘culture’.’” It is seen as an all-
reaching, all-encompassing objective idea that contains 
all therein. Cf. Ibid., “Culture and Administration,” Ibid., 
108. 
15 Ibid., 104. 
16 Ibid., 105. 
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and the invisible, ideology structures 
the social reality.17  
Ideology becomes a performative basis qua 
social reality in which ideological practices 
mediate conscious and unconscious actions. 
“‘[W]ithin our practical interrelations’ — Marx 
locates the fetishistic illusion not in thinking, in 
how we misperceive what we do and are, but 
in our social practice itself.”18 Marx sees the 
social dimension: ideology does not breed in 
isolation; as social structures come about, there 
flourishes this corruptive practice of adhering 
to ideologies. Analyzing these ideologies form 
the bridge between the conscious and 
unconscious. With the shift of consciousness, 
Žižek speaks and even reforms the classic 
Marxist statement of „Sie wissen das nicht, aber sie 
tun es‟ into „Sie wissen das, und doch tun sie es.‟19 
The movement from not knowing and doing to 
knowing yet still doing signifies how mass culture 
has preconditioned consumers to simply 
accept whitewashed realities presented by the 
industry. The establishment of the ideological-
image which strengthens this performative 
basis is the promise of jouissance or a fantasy that 
could be received.  
For Žižek, every ideology 
attaches itself to some kernel of 
                                                          
17 Samuel Raybone, “Notes Towards Practicing 
Žižekian Ideology Critique as an Art Historical 
Methodology,” International Journal of Žižek Studies, Vol. 
10, No. 3 (2016). 
18 Slavoj Žižek, Living in the End Times (London: 
Verso, 2010), 223, Quoting Karl Marx, Capital: A Critique 
of Political Economy, Volume I (Chicago: Charles H. Kerr & 
Co.), 171-173; available from 
www.econlib.org/library/YPDBooks/Marx/mrxCpA1.
html; Internet; accessed 25 April 2017. 
19 The first statement of „Sie wissen das nicht, aber 
sie tun es‟ is a well-known Marxist statement found in the 
Kaptial (Karl Marx, , Erster Abschnitt: Ware und Geld‛, 
Das Kapital: Kritik der politischen Ökonomie, Buch 1: Der 
jouissance, the regulation and 
organization of which is central to its 
functioning. Following Lacan, Žižek 
reads jouissance as a Real, the 
paradoxical emergence of pleasure 
through pain which is always 
constituted as a surplus. […] 
Consequently, jouissance returns 
symptomatically in the form of 
distortions and disturbances, which 
can be read in the process of ideology 
critique.20  
The lack of critical assessment which the 
culture industry promulgates through 
amalgamizing what is entertaining and 
excluding what is contradictory builds the 
semblance of a well-functioning system. The 
inherently errors of this structure is something 
devoid of language because “[w]hat the official 
ideology cannot openly talk about may be 
revealed in the mute signs of a building.”21 
Hence, the close connexion of ideology and 
fantasy or jouissance is revealed: fantasy ushers 
in a lust for another state of things. This is what 
the emancipatory-image is precisely about. The 
lust for is translatable to a possibility for another 
state of things. Yet there is but a thin line that 
differentiates a motivation and a self-referential 
idea—the latter is the illusion that ultimately 
Produktionsprozeß des Kapitals; available from 
https://archive.org/details/KarlMarxDasKapitalpdf; 
Open source; accessed 25 April 2017). The second 
statement „Sie wissen das, und sie tun es‟ is a creative 
rendition of the first following the thought of Raybone 
as he presents how Žižek recreates the Marxist dictum 
into that of the 20th century dictum of the adherence to 
ideology (Cf. Raybone, “Notes Towards Practicing 
Žižekian Ideology Critique as an Art Historical 
Methodology”). The German translation is mine for a 
better parallelism between the two statements. 
20 Ibid. 
21 Žižek, Living in the End Times, 255. 
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can be coined as a “fragile ideological 
fantasy.”22 
Once more I return to the importance 
of the emancipatory-image as jouissance. “Its 
great task is to break the hold over us of the 
superego injunction to enjoy, that is, to help us 
include in the freedom to enjoy also the 
freedom not to enjoy, the freedom from 
enjoyment.”23 The freedom that the 
emancipatory-image assures individuals is the 
freedom to indulge in such promising fantasies 
that engages one’s potentialities. In this 
respect, it is a freedom prior to actual freedom; 
“fantasy is not a hallucination or an illusion, or 
a potential avenue of escape from reality, but 
the very stuff of our social reality.”24 In fantasy, 
in jouissance, an individual comes to terms with 
one’s social reality: another state of things, of 
how reality could have been. 
6 
In essence, culture is this form of an 
independent totality which embodies reality: 
“[something] higher and more pure, 
[untouchable] which cannot be tailored 
according to any tactical or technical 
considerations. […] the manifestation of pure 
humanity without regard for its functional 
relationships within society.”25 From this 
precise account of culture, it shifts to a “passive 
site onto and through which the phantasmic 
visions which bolster the status quo are 
projected and experienced.”26 Amidst this, 
                                                          
22 Ibid., 285. 
23 Žižek, Living in the End Times, 74. 
24 Raybone, “Notes Towards Practicing 
Žižekian Ideology Critique as an Art Historical 
Methodology”. 
25 Adorno, “Culture and Administration,” The 
Culture Industry: Selected Essays on Mass Culture, 108. 
what remains is a disposition and a personal 
encounter with culture, specifically with art. 
“Artworks are afterimages of empirical life 
insofar as they help the latter to what is denied 
them outside their own sphere and thereby free 
it from that to which they are condemned by 
reified external experience.”27 Art can show 
otherwise—for this reason people are drawn to 
it: the harmony of songs, the strokes of 
paintings, the arrangements, shapes, and order 
of architectural designs. These drop inklings of 
the emancipatory-image. In an individual’s 
encounter with art, there still present is this 
jouissance, however the tendency for the 
ideological formation is ever strong, and 
unknowingly the consumer has embraced it. It 
is a self-referential idea that convinces 
individuals to lust for what they see: a static way 
of living. Instead of liberation, consumers 
embrace ideology through their fetishized 
tastes for after-images of art. A self-referential 
lusting must capacitate individuals for a 
dynamic understanding of reality. Hence, it is 
not the numerous experiences with the 
artworks but the quality of those that the 
emancipatory-image forms;  “[w]hile the 
artwork’s sensual appeal seemingly brings it 
close to the consumer, it is alienated from him 
by being a commodity that he possesses and 
the loss of which he must constantly fear.”28 It 
is in consuming commodified art that jouissance, 
this lust for the emancipatory-image, is 
relegated to the valley of ideology in the after-
image of art.   
26 Raybone, “Notes Towards Practicing 
Žižekian Ideology Critique as an Art Historical 
Methodology”. 
27 Adorno, “The Autonomy of Art,” Negative 
Dialectics, 4. 
28 Adorno, “The Autonomy of Art,” Negative 
Dialectics, 13. 
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